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TITLE VII, VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND RICCI: RESCUING
MUNICIPALITIES FROM A LEGAL ‘BACKDRAFT’
JARED D. STUECKLE*
The Supreme Court recently decided Ricci v. DeStefano, a case that had
municipalities throughout the United States holding their breath. This case presents a
scenario where either action by a municipal employer would result in potential liability
under Title VII. Thus, the policy goal of Title VII—encouraging the voluntary
compliance of employers by relaxing standards for liability when these attempts are
made in good faith—is in danger of being undermined. This note examines both sides of
this issue in light of the policy goals of Title VII. The note then delves into the
background of the case, analyzes the legal claims made by both parties, and then analyzes
the Supreme Court’s ruling. possible outcomes of this case and the potential impact of
these outcomes on similar future situations. Finally, the article asks whether the Court is
able to find an appropriate middle-ground and how the Court’s new standard will be
affect future litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Frank Ricci, a New Haven firefighter, spent months in preparation for a
promotional exam.1 In addition to countless hours of study, he incurred
additional personal costs to buy supplements and pay a friend to transcribe
them to audio cassette in order to cope with his dyslexia.2 The results of the
exam put Ricci in position for a promotion, but the overall results were regarded
as troublesome by the City of New Haven and the New Haven Civil Service
Board (CSB) because of the racially disproportionate results.3 The CSB and the
City of New Haven found themselves wedged between the proverbial “rock and
a hard place.” Voting to certify the results would make them vulnerable to a
claim from minority applicants. However, refusing to certify the test results
could potentially create a reverse discrimination claim from the successful
applicants whose test results were nullified.4
The issue in Ricci v. DeStefano is whether municipalities are subject to
reverse discrimination claims under Title VII by refusing to certify test results
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3. Id. at 145.
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with an adverse impact on employees of a protected class.5 This note begins by
providing a brief background of employment discrimination law and the policy
behind Title VII. Next, this note discusses the background of the case in the
context of employment law and Title VII. After analyzing the case, this note will
introduce the legal issues that are implicated and assess the validity of each
claim. Then, the final section examines analyzes the Supreme Court’s rulings
and how the ruling will affect how lower courts treat similar situations in the
future.
II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
This section gives a brief background in employment discrimination law
and addresses the legal mechanisms of Title VII that are necessary to understand
the intricacies of the Ricci case. The important social policies behind Title VII will
be analyzed as they relate to this case and to employment discrimination in
general.
A. The Law
The 1960’s instituted sweeping change in society as well as in the field of
employment law, highlighted by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 A
key provision of the act is Title VII, which grants protection to employees from
certain employment actions based on their status, such as race, sex, color,
religion, or national origin.7 For example, an employer violates Title VII by
refusing to hire an applicant because of the applicant’s race. Proscribing
employment actions based on an employee’s status forces employers to consider
the individual’s merits for the specific job and prohibits treatment based on
conscious or unconscious stereotypes about their membership in a protected
class.8
Two ways that Title VII protects employees is by prohibiting disparate
treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment occurs where an “employer
simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
religion, sex, or national origin.”9 Employees are only protected where the
employer’s action affects the terms and conditions10 of their employment and
where the action was ‘because of’ the employee’s membership in a protected
class.11 Disparate treatment based on any such status is prohibited under Title

5. Ricci v. DeStefano (Ricci II), 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
894 (mem.) (U.S. Jan. 9, 2009) (No. 08-328).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). See generally Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 520-22 (2001) (examining
contemporary solutions to more subtle and complex forms of employment discrimination).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-324 (1986-87).
9. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335, n.15 (1977).
10. Minor v. Centocor, 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006).
11. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973). This requirement ensures
causation between an employer’s actions and the motives behind the action. This element
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VII; even a white male who gets fired because of his race or gender has a valid
claim under Title VII, known as reverse discrimination.12
In contrast, disparate impact occurs where an employer institutes what
seems to be a neutral policy, “but that in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.”13 An employer
would, under disparate impact, violate Title VII by requiring all secretaries to be
5’6” or shorter, if this policy disproportionately prevented men from obtaining
these positions and if the height requirement was not related to the actual
performance of secretarial work.14 Disparate impact protection, however, does
not extend to the majority and thus, a disparate impact claim may only be
brought by a person in the minority.15
Employment discrimination claims use a burden-shifting format. For
example, in a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff is required to present a
prima facie case of discrimination, which requires only a burden of production.16
The burden then shifts to the employer to produce a plausible and legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for the decision.17 The burden then shifts back to the
plaintiff to persuade the factfinder that unlawful discrimination did occur by
offering proof that discrimination was the sole motive or that it was a
contributing factor to the adverse employment action.18 No matter how the
differentiates between an employer, who may have racist attitudes, that fires a black employee
because of a personality conflict, and an employer who fires a black employee because of a racial
animus; the former being allowed under Title VII and the latter prohibited. The key distinction is
that the first employee was fired for a job-related reason (getting along with supervisors) and the
second employee was fired for a reason unrelated to that employee’s job performance (their race).
See id.
12. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail, 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Title VII prohibits “[d]iscriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority”). For an in-depth look at Griggs, see Michael Selmi, Was Disparate Impact Theory
a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006).
13. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15 (1977). “The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
Discriminatory tests are impermissible unless they are “predictive of or significantly correlated with
important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which
candidates are being evaluated.” 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1978). The correlation must be shown by
professionally acceptable methods. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
14. If the height requirement was validly tied to the actual performance of a secretarial job, or
was in some way necessary for the duties of a secretary, then the business necessity of such a
requirement would provide an affirmative defense to a disparate impact claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k). Even if a requirement is a business necessity, it will not be allowed if there are other less
discriminatory alternatives available. See id.; Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387 (1995-96).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). Another key distinction between the two theories is that disparate
treatment requires a showing of discriminatory intent, whereas disparate impact does not. See
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15 (1977).
16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The prima facie standard is minimal, requiring proof
that the plaintiff belongs to a protected group, that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action at the hands of the defendant, and that the defendant was motivated to take such an action
because of the plaintiff’s protected status. See id.
17. Id. Again, the burden at this stage is but one of production.
18. Id. at 804. Under a single-motive proof structure, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual, and that there exists an underlying intent to discriminate.
Id. Under a mixed-motive structure, the plaintiff must prove the defendant took the plaintiff’s
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employer makes the decision, “a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed
unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that process and
had a determinative influence on the outcome.”19
B. The Policy
Title VII established a new foundation that would shape the workforce as
America entered the twentieth century. It arose out of a fundamental need of
protection for employees, directly because discrimination had become
commonplace in, and even a fundamental part of, the workforce. Title VII
prohibits “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers” that seek to limit or
classify applicants for employment or deprive them of any employment
opportunities.’20 Put more simply, Title VII makes “it an illegal practice to use
race as a factor in denying employment.”21 Title VII even bans reverse
discrimination, extending protection from minority to non-minority
employees.22
Title VII also promotes the idea that employees should be considered based
on their individual merit as an employee, not based on assumptions about
groups of people. The goal of Title VII is that criteria will measure the person for
the job, not the person in the abstract; such assumptions or stereotypes are
irrelevant to an individual’s performance on the job. Title VII also attempts to
prevent unconscious stereotypes from impermissibly altering the workforce by
prohibiting policies that may seem neutral on their face, but that discriminate
when put into practice. In this way, “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment” are prohibited, even if they operate “invidiously.”23
Congress was also concerned about efficiency in America’s workforce, and
felt that only through “fair and racially neutral employment and personnel
decisions” could efficiency be maximized.24 The underlying theory is that
diversity increases efficiency and maximizes value by assigning the best person
for the job. From a societal perspective, diversity helps workers develop socially
constructive skills, such as learning how to work well with different types of

protected status into account, as one of many other reasons that factored into the defendant’s
decision. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The result under a mixed-motive case
is that damages may be limited if the defendant is able to prove that the same decision would have
resulted even if the discriminatory motive had not entered into the decision-making process. See id.
See also Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982) (examining the causation requirements under mixedmotive structures in comparison to pretext under a single motive structure).
19. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). Disparate impact claims also use a
burden shifting format, but knowledge of such a format is unnecessary to understand Ricci.
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
21. 110 CONG. REC. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
22. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
23. Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). “Every individual employee is protected against both
discriminatory treatment and against practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation.”
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455-56.
24. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
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people. Overall, Title VII views diversity as socially beneficial and intrinsically
beneficial, such that diversity is good for its own sake.25
Title VII encourages voluntary compliance by promoting voluntary
settlement of employment discrimination claims, encouraging employers to
implement preventative measures, and offering incentives for employers by
easing the evidentiary burdens for employers who voluntarily comply with Title
VII. Encouraging voluntary compliance benefits society as a whole, by instilling
the idea that everyone has the right to equal employment opportunities.
Transforming this concept into an internal entitlement, regulated privately, as
well as enforcing it as an external requirement, regulated governmentally, leads
to more effective compliance in society, which in turn reduces the institutional
costs of regulation. In this area, voluntary affirmative action has been allowed as
a way to improve on the past discrimination of a class of people in the
workforce. Affirmative action does this by attempting to level the playing field,
or make up for all of the structural and socio-economic disadvantages that
minorities face in competing in an open market.
III. RICCI V. DESTEFANO – A BACKGROUND
This section will provide a brief overview of the case and its procedural
history. Then, the significant facts will be presented and analyzed in relation to
the perspectives of each party, which serve as an important backdrop to the
analysis of the legal claims in the following section.
A. Overview
In late 2003, the New Haven Fire Department administered oral and
written tests as part of the promotional process to reach the ranks of Lieutenant
and Captain.26 A total of 118 applicants took the test, of which there were 68
white applicants, 27 black applicants, and 23 Hispanic applicants.27 Based on the
test results and the city’s hiring policies,28 zero African American applicants and
only two Hispanic applicants would even be eligible for promotion.29 The New
Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) then held hearings to determine whether or not
to certify the results of the exam.30 During these meetings, the CSB was advised
that the exam results showed a “very significant disparate impact.”31 Applicants,
experts, and community leaders testified in support of both sides, and the

25. But see Matthew J. Lindsay, How Antidiscrimination Law Learned to Live With Racial Inequality,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 87, 120-24 (2006) (contrasting diversity with social engineering).
26. Ricci II, 530 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2008) (Cabranes dissenting).
27. Id.
28. The city had instituted a ‘Rule of Three’ mandate that required a vacancy to be filled from
among the three individuals with the highest cumulative score. Id. at 103.
29. Id. at 94. These numbers are based on immediate openings, but since test results remain
active for 1-2 years, future openings would enable three African American applicants to be
promoted to Lieutenant. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 11, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428
(U.S. Aug. 21, 2008).
30. See Ricci II, 530 F.3d at 104.
31. Id. at 104.
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resulting vote of the CSB ended in a tie.32 Since a tie meant the results were not
affirmatively certified, 18 applicants filed a reverse discrimination claim of
disparate treatment in the District Court of Connecticut.33
The District Court ruled in favor of the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.34 On
appeal, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the ruling of the District Court with a summary order.35 The panel later
withdrew the summary order and issued a per curiam opinion, which adopted
the District Court’s ruling in toto.36 On a narrow majority vote, the Second
Circuit opted not to rehear the case en banc.37 The Supreme Court, after hearing
arguments, ruled in favor of the petitioners and reinstated the original test
scores.38
B. The Construction of the Test
The promotional exam, prepared by Industrial/Organizational Solutions,
Inc. (IOS), an independent test-making company, was constructed by issuing a
questionnaire from a random sample of captains and lieutenants in order to
highlight the most important skills for each position.39 Once the key skills were
identified, the list was then sent to all captains and lieutenants who then
assigned a ranking to the particular qualities/skills.40 The key qualities and
skills identified were then used as the foundation in constructing the oral and
written portions of the exam.41 As per the contract between the city and the
firefighter’s union, the weight of the written portion was set at 60% and the
weight of the oral portion at 40%.42 A cumulative score of 70 was set as the cutoff score to determine a passing grade.43 Each portion of the exam was reviewed
independently, and a syllabus was given to all applicants.44 All of the test
questions came from the listed study materials, with the syllabus identifying
specific chapters in the study materials.45
The results of the test revealed “significant and unexpected racial
disparities.”46 Out of the 41 applicants for Captain (with 8 black applicants and 8
Hispanic applicants), only 2 Hispanic candidates would be eligible for the 7

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
2008).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 104-08.
Id. at 103, 108.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ricci v. DiStefano (Ricci III), 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2678 (U.S. 2009)
Id. at 103; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. May 14,
Ricci II, 530 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 105.
Id. at 103.
Id.
Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147.
Ricci II, 530 F.3d 87 at 107.
Supplemental Brief of Respondents at 4, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2008).
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openings.47 Out of the 77 applicants for Lieutenant (with 19 black applicants and
15 Hispanic applicants), no minority candidates qualified for the 8 vacancies.48
However, for the exam to remain valid, certification of the results was required
by the New Haven Civil Service Board (CSB) in order to actually begin filling
vacancies.49
C. Two Perspectives on the Hearings
The CSB held five public hearings to determine whether or not to certify
the results of the exam.50 The vote by the CSB at the conclusion of the hearings
ended in a tie, effectively denying certification of the test results. The hearings
set the stage for the litigation that followed and provide a crucial insight on
whether or not the exam was validly constructed and whether improper
motives influenced the vote of the CSB.
The petitioners claimed that nothing from the hearings proved the exam
invalid. The hearings showed the great lengths that the City went to
meticulously construct the test to assess the key skills and abilities of applicants
in relation to the specific position.51 The preparers of the exam also sought to
reduce racial disparity by over-representing minorities throughout each stage of
development, by writing the exam below a tenth grade reading level, and by
allowing candidates to take the oral portion regardless of their performance on
the written portion.52
The City, in contrast, argued that the hearings established deficiencies in
the exam’s construction, which when combined with the racially disparate
results, justified certification being refused. During the hearings, multiple
experts testified that results showing such a severe racial disparity are a clear
signal that the exam may be faulty. Additionally, IOS admitted that the chosen
cut-off score of 70 did not actually reflect the minimal competence for
promotion; in other words, it was chosen arbitrarily.53 The scores from the exam
were to be ranked and promotions would be determined from the rankings,
requiring precise scoring to reflect “better anticipated job performance” for each
higher score.54 Yet IOS, in the testimony of a representative at one of the
hearings, never testified that the calibration was “precise enough to be used to
rank-order candidates.”55

47. Ricci II, 530 F.3d at 103.
48. Id. at 104.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Ricci III, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2678 (U.S. 2009).
52. Id. at 105-06. Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 7-8, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S.
Aug. 21, 2008). The oral portion of the exam was also constructed to mitigate racial disparities by
thoroughly training each evaluator and by requiring that each three-person evaluation panel have
two minority evaluators.
53. See Supplemental Brief of Respondents at 30, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 08-328 (U.S. Nov. 13,
2008). “Where cutoff scores are used, they should normally be set so as to be reasonable and
consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work force.” 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5.
54. Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 31, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 07-1428 (U.S. March 2009).
55. Id.
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The motivation behind the vote for certification was crucial in determining
if the City violated Title VII. The petitioners claimed that the City’s argument
was merely pretext, to cover up for insufficiencies in the hearings and the
political pressure that improperly influenced the CSB’s vote. To establish
pretext, petitioners claimed that Boise Kimber, and influential leaders in the
black community who had previously supported Mayor DeStefano, conspired
with DeStefano to “privately push the board to scuttle the promotions.”56
Destefano opposed certification because of the political ramifications of
disappointing Kimber, and DeStefano even discussed making the hearings seem
neutral and deliberate in order to cover up the racial and political motivations.57
Further evidence of pretext was shown by the refusal of the CSB to allow two
top New Haven Fire Department officials, who helped develop the test, and one
of whom is black, to testify that the exam was “fair and valid.”58
The City, on the other hand, claimed that legitimate concerns about the
exam and the disparate results it produced, along with the duty to comply with
Title VII, motivated the CSB’s decision. The validity and job-relatedness of the
test was put in doubt during the hearings. Examples such as the lack of a valid
cut-off score,59 the doubt regarding whether the test was calibrated to be precise
enough to be used for rank-order scoring,60 the failure to review the test within
the department,61 contradictory information in the source material,62 and the
testing of irrelevant material63 left serious questions about the exam’s validity.
Problems with the test and the development of the test, combined with the test’s
racially disparate results, supported the City’s claim that they acted in good
faith to voluntarily comply with Title VII.
IV. ANALYZING THE LEGAL CLAIMS
The petitioners in Ricci alleged that the City’s actions violated the Equal
Protection Clause and/or Title VII. The majority of this section will analyze the
Title VII claim, followed by a brief discussion about the Equal Protection Claim.
The two main issues in the Title VII claim are whether the City was actually
motivated by a duty to voluntarily comply with Title VII and whether the City
was allowed, under Title VII, to refuse to act on the results of a test because of its
racially disparate results.
A. Motivation: Duty to Comply or a Mere Pretext for Discrimination?
The focus of a disparate treatment claim is whether discriminatory intent
motivated the employer’s decision. In a typical case, the employer proffers a
legitimate reason for the decision, and the plaintiff must then persuade the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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factfinder that the proffered reason is actually pretext for discrimination. When
applying this standard to Ricci, the focus is whether the CSB’s decision was
motivated by the race of the petitioners or by their proffered legitimate
explanation, their duty to voluntarily comply with Title VII and avoid disparate
impact discrimination.
Although the evidentiary burden of production shifts in the preliminary
stages of a disparate treatment case, the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier
of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff.”64 To meet this burden, the defendant’s
legitimate reason must be shown to be a pretext for discrimination: that the
defendant’s reasons were “not its true reasons,”65 and that they are “unworthy
of credence.”66 Thus, a plaintiff may prevail by meeting its prima facie case and
disproving the defendant’s explanation, but shall prevail by disproving the
defendant’s reason and offering persuasive evidence that discriminatory intent
actually motivated the decision.67 The Supreme Court found that the petitioners
proffered enough evidence to prove that the City was motivated by
discriminatory intent, and that “fear of litigation alone” could not justify
refusing to certify the test.68
In its decision, the Supreme Court dismisses any notion that the test was
not job-related and consistent with business necessity.69 The Court states that
there is “no genuine dispute” and that any claims to the contrary are blatantly
contradicted by the record.70 However, the Court declines to address serious
issues with the test, specifically the failure to establish an appropriate cut-off
score for the exam, the failure to internally review the exam for inconsistencies,
and the failure to precisely calibrate the scoring of the exam to correlate with a
candidate’s expected job performance. The most likely interpretation of why
these issues did not sway the Court is that the City did not ask for a follow-up
report from IOS, which was offered, regarding the test’s consistency with EEOC
guidelines for examination validation.71 The Court implicitly suggests that the
City’s decision about the test’s validity had already been made prior to the CSB
hearings, and that no amount of evidence pertaining to the validity of the exam
would have persuaded the City that the test was not valid.72 Had the City
requested the technical report from IOS and done more unbiased research into
the exam’s validity, it is possible that the concerns found with the exam would
have persuaded the Court to rule in the City’s favor. However, the City’s
reactions to the exam results and its lack of follow-up with the creators of the

64. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 256.
67. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). Disproving the
proffered legitimate reason “is not always sufficient to sustain an ultimate finding of intentional
discrimination.” Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1338 (1997).
68. See Ricci III, at 2680
69. Ricci III, at 2678.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 2679.
72. See id. (stating that the city “turned a blind eye to evidence that supported the exam’s
validity”).
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exam displayed an air of pretext, resulting in the Court’s finding for the
petitioners.
Another potential interpretation of the Supreme Court’s finding is that an
exam need not be perfect, but only job-related and consistent with business
necessity. Therefore, any deficiencies found in this exam only demonstrated that
although the test was not perfect, the deficiencies were not significant enough to
call into question the job-relatedness of the test. This, paired with the pretextual
motive of the City, were enough to persuade the Supreme Court to overturn the
lower court’s decision and rule in favor of the petitioners.
Additionally, the Court found that there was no genuine issue of material
fact that a less discriminatory alternative was available to the City.73 The City
claimed that adjusting the weight of the scores, or that allowing the scores to be
banded74, would create less discriminatory results.75 The Court correctly noted
that both of these options would violate the Title VII prohibition on adjusting
test scores.76 The City further argued that an available less discriminatory
alternative was available, as evidenced by the testimony of Christopher Hornick
who suggested the use of an ‘assessment center’ approach as a way to reduce
discriminatory impact.77 The Court dismissed this contention because his overall
testimony suggested that the City should certify the results and that this “brief
mention. . .standing alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact.”78
B. When can a Municipality Refuse to Certify Test Results?
Petitioner’s claim that the City violated Title VII by refusing to certify the
results of a valid promotional exam fails in three ways. Title VII proscribes
certain types of use in relation to test scores: adjusting scores, using different
cut-off scores, or otherwise altering scores on the basis of race.79 First, the City
did not use the test scores. According to the plain meaning of the statute, Title
VII bans only specific types of use when based on race and thus, a decision not
to use a test cannot be deemed a “discriminatory use.”80 Second, declining to use
a test is different than adjusting or altering test results. Once again, an
adjustment or alteration suggests usage, and a decision not to use test results
does not change the scores of the test-takers (which is prohibited), it nullifies the
process. Legislative history speaks directly to this point, stating that the
provision does not “require that test scores be used at all.”81 As previously
discussed, the decision by the CSB was not made on the basis of race, although

73. Id. at 2679-81.
74. Banding is “the practice of rounding scores to the nearest whole number and considering all
candidates with the same whole-number score as being of one rank.” Id. at 2679-80.
75. Id. at 2679-80.
76. Id. Allowing these actions would permit race-norming or other quota-systems that would
potentially violate the Equal Protection Clause and would go against the overall goals of Title VII.
77. Id. at 2668-69.
78. Id. at 2680.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l).
80. Id. Even the title of this particular statute, “Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores,”
implicates it is restricting use, and not non-use. Id.
81. 137 CONG. REC. 15,472 (1991) (statement of Sen. Gore).
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the disparate results signaled that the test might potentially be invalid, the
decision was made because of concerns about the job-relatedness of the test and
the test development process, as well as the availability of alternatives with less
racial disparities.82 Finally, imposing a higher burden, such as a requirement to
validate a test, “on a party seeking to comply voluntarily with Title VII is
contrary to the case law and the statute’s underlying policy.”83 The heightened
burden is specifically contrary to Title VII’s preference for voluntary
compliance, since it requires a judicial determination before remedial action can
be taken.84 Such a position contravenes the “strong preference for encouraging
voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims.”85
C. Equal Protection86
The hallmark of the Equal Protection Clause is the tenet that “the
government may not subject persons to unequal treatment based on race.”87
Race-based classifications, those that explicitly distinguish “between people on
the basis of some protected category,” are subject to strict scrutiny by courts.88
However, merely being “conscious of race” in taking an action does not
immediately subject the actor to strict scrutiny.89 The distinction between a racial
classification and being ‘race-conscious’ strikes a balance between constitutional
legislation using a “suspect tool” such as race to achieve an important goal and
unconstitutional legislation using such classifications unnecessarily. Equal
Protection also extends to a facially neutral law, providing it is motivated by

82. See supra, Part IV.A.1.
83. Bushey v. New York State Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 733 F.2d 220, 226 (1984). “The guidelines do
not require or mandate a validity study where an employer decides against using a certain selection
procedure that manifests” racially adverse impact. Ricci I, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 155 (D. Conn. 2006).
84. Id.
85. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981).
86. Since the Supreme Court decided Ricci on other grounds, the court did not consider the
Equal Protection issue apparent in the case. See Ricci III, at 2681 (Scalia, concurring).
87. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 49 (1999). For an interesting article examining the
tensions between equal protection and disparate impact law, specifically how equal protection could
be used to invalidate disparate impact law, see Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494 (2003-2004).
88. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967). See also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that “the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses
of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant the use
of a highly suspect tool”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating that classifications
requiring strict scrutiny “are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests”). For an in-depth study on City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., see Michael
Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87
MICH. L. REV. 7, 1729 (June 1989).
89. Hayden, 180 F.3d at 49. This brings out an interesting tension in Title VII’s underlying policy.
Disparate treatment prohibits decisions based on race and thus discourages focusing on an
employee’s race. However, disparate impact prohibits unintentional discrimination, and thus
mandates employers to focus on the racial makeup of their workforce in order to avoid racially
adverse practices. See also Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 5, 953 (Mar. 1993) (criticizing the
‘colorblind’ movement by comparing transparency with discriminatory effect in employment
discrimination law).
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discriminatory intent90 and its application results in a discriminatory effect,91 or
if the law is applied in a discriminatory fashion.92
Petitioners characterized the City’s refusal to certify the results of the
promotional exam as “a race-based government action grounded solely on the
racial distribution of the test results.”93 The main problem with this
characterization is that it relies on cases where race was specifically taken into
account in the decision to promote, whether by race-norming the test results or
by race-based eligibility lists.94 In contrast, the City’s decision not to certify the
test results and to pursue other less discriminatory measures is not a racial
classification because it does not treat candidates “differently on account of their
race.”95 Petitioners rely on the City’s “race-coded list” as proof of racial
classification, yet the EEOC requires employers to keep such lists to record the
racial impact of employment practices.96 Courts have consistently exempted
actions from strict scrutiny that are “necessarily conscious of race” as long as the
actions treat “all persons equally.”97 The City should not be subjected to strict
scrutiny merely by being aware of a racial disparate impact and taking action to
avoid such disparity, since certification was denied for all candidates, regardless
of their race.
Petitioners also claim, in the alternative, that the decision of the CSB was
motivated by discriminatory intent and had a discriminatory effect on the
successful candidates because of their race.98 Yet petitioners try to prove
discriminatory intent by pointing to the City’s awareness of racial disparity, and
as such should be subject to strict scrutiny because they were motivated to
remedy disparate impact due to race.99 Case law, however, is well established
that an “intent to remedy the disparate impact [of] the prior exams is not
equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants.”100
Further, Congress actually mandates “the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
90. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (finding that discriminatory intent is
evident when a decision-maker selects a “particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
91. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977).
92. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). See also Hayden, 180 F.3d at 49 (ruling that a
test administered uniformly to all applicants did not implicate an express racial classification).
93. Pet. Brief at 18, Docket Nos. 07-1428, 08-328.
94. See Williams v. Pharmacia, 137 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir.1998); Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382
F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004).
95. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537 (1982).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(A) (stating that employers “should maintain and have available for
inspection records or other information which will disclose the impact which its tests and other
selection procedures have upon employment opportunities of persons by identifiable race, sex, or
ethnic group”).
97. Hayden at 49. Mechanisms that “are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment
based on a classification” are unlikely to demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
98. This is assuming that the test is in fact valid, since there are no “vested rights,” Billish v.
City of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Posner, J.), in a “wrongfully awarded job
to which another is entitled,” Croson, 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
99. Pet. Brief at 18, Docket Nos. 07-1428, 08-328.
100. Hayden at 51.
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unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate.”101 Accordingly, the City’s actions should not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.
V. THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING
The district court’s proffered test for liability would have established that
“a public employer, when faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact
liability under Title VII, does not violate Title VII of the Equal Protection Clause
by taking facially neutral, albeit race-conscious, actions to avoid liability.”102 The
district court tried to balance the interests of Title VII with the Equal Protection
Clause, but the ruling was too broad. A municipality’s “desire to mitigate or
avoid disparate impact does not justify preferential treatment for any group,”103
and merely requiring a prima facie disparate impact case to invoke a blanket
defense of voluntary compliance opens the door for potential abuse. Since, in
some cases, a prima facie disparate impact case can be made by relying on
results alone, a municipality could avoid any further showing or investigation
into the test, and deny the results based solely on the race of the successful
candidates. Judge Cabranes, in his dissenting opinion, feared that “municipal
employers could reject the results of an employment examination whenever
those results failed to yield a desired racial outcome.”104 This would create a
quota-like system, yet benefit employers by allowing them to avoid liability and
proper judicial scrutiny.105 Applying this test allows a potential defense based
on a showing of numbers alone, allowing for potential abuse by closing off
inquiry into the motivations of the municipality and by preventing a finding of
pretext.
In reversing the district court, the Supreme Court ruled that “fear of
litigation alone” cannot justify race-based disparate treatment.106 The court
borrowed the strong-basis-in-evidence standard (Strong Basis Test) from cases
involving the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to determine
when certain race-based remedial actions by governmental entities are
constitutional.107 In applying this standard, the Supreme Court sought to read
disparate treatment and disparate impact prohibitions together.108 Requiring a
higher burden of production from municipalities prevents a ‘blanket defense’109
to liability and also safeguards the legitimate expectations of employees. The
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
102. Ricci II, 530 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) (Parker, J., concurring).
103. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 684.
104. Id. at 98.
105. See id.
106. Ricci III, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2681 (U.S. 2009).
107. Id. at 2675.
108. Id.
109. Allowing a ‘blanket defense’ to disparate treatment claims based on a subjective fear of
liability for disparate impact would diminish the effectiveness of employment discrimination law.
This would allow any employer in a similar scenario to claim that they took action for fear of
liability, even if this fear is objectively unreasonable. The ‘blanket defense’ would also curb
voluntary compliance because employers armed with such a wide-reaching defense would be less
worried about litigation and thus less motivated to take preventative measures.
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new standard also follows logically with established precedent that prohibits the
race-norming of test results.110 Since the changing of test results to create a
racially preferable workplace is not allowed, it follows that throwing out test
results because the results are not racially preferable should also be
prohibited.111
The Supreme Court then applied the standard to the facts of the case and
issued summary judgment in favor of the petitioners.112 The City relied on the
disparate results of the test in choosing not to certify the exam, but did not
sufficiently proffer enough evidence that the exam was not justified by business
necessity or that a less prejudicial alternative existed at the time.113
A. Is the Strong Basis Test the Correct Standard?
The Strong Basis Test, as applied in Ricci, requires that governmental
agencies go beyond a mere prima facie showing of disparate impact liability.114
There must also be a strong-basis-in-evidence that the exam is not a business
necessity or that there is a less prejudicial means of testing.115 In adopting this
standard, the majority relied on Croson and Wygant, both Equal Protection cases
where race was the “decisive factor.”116
The dissent argues against the Strong Basis Test, in favor of a less
demanding standard. Employers would not be subject to disparate treatment
liability if they had reasonable doubts about the reliability of the scores.117 This
standard seems to give an employer who is striving to voluntarily comply with
Title VII the benefit of the doubt, as long as it has “good cause to believe the
[testing] device would not withstand examination for business necessity.”118
This standard is likened to affirmative action cases, where under an affirmative
action plan race is an acceptable consideration if race is only “one of numerous
factors.”119
Both the majority and the dissent offer a compelling analysis of prior case
law and a persuasive argument for applying each standard. This begs the
question, which standard is better? Unfortunately, the answer to this question
depends on which underlying policy of Title VII the “decider” thinks is more
important. The dissent aptly criticizes the majority’s lack of clarity in applying
the Strong Basis Test, as key questions are left unanswered, and will no doubt be
litigated in the lower courts for years to come.120 By suggesting a less stringent
standard, the dissent similarly neglects to adequately clarify the threshold for its

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Ricci III, at 2676.
Id.
Id. at 2664.
Id.
See id. at 2675-76.
Id.
Ricci III, dissent, at 2701.
Ricci III, dissent, at 2699.
Id.
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
See Ricci III, dissent, at 2699, 2701.
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proffered standard.121 The Strong Basis Test borders on being too strict a
standard and it is unclear where a showing of a strong-basis-in-evidence begins
and having to establish a “provable, actual violation” ends.122 In the same vein,
the dissent’s standard borders on being too permissive, failing to clarify what
exactly constitutes reasonable doubts about an exam’s reliability, and when
exactly an employer has “good cause” to doubt business necessity.123
Each side also champions different policy justifications to rationalize its
preferred standard. Under the dissent’s more lenient standard, a benefit of the
doubt is given to employers who are presented with disparate results of
employment practices, reasonably doubt the dubious practices, and seek to
voluntarily comply with Title VII by suspending the suspicious practices in
order to prevent further disparate impact.124 This rule, if implemented, is
potentially dangerous because the standard of proof is low, and seemingly
subjective, in that it is dependent on the belief of the employer that an
employment practice is not a business necessity. Thus, in the name of voluntary
compliance, the courts could potentially be sanctioning a defense to disparate
treatment that could be easily abused.125 Additionally, such a low standard
presents a danger of instituting de facto quota systems, which is also inapposite
to the goals of Title VII.126
The dissent argues that the Strong Basis Test is vague, potentially too strict,
and thwarts the Title VII policy to encourage voluntary compliance.127 While
this criticism indeed has its merit, a more stringent standard in cases such as
Ricci is logically appropriate. In Ricci, New Haven wanted to throw the test
results out (an action that is definitely disparate treatment) because of the
racially disparate results of the promotional exam (which may or may not have
been the result of illegal disparate impact).128 A stricter test is justified because in
order to engage in disparate treatment, an employer should have to show more
than a mere possibility of disparate impact.
Consider a “smoke without fire”129 scenario where a municipality uses a
promotional exam that distinguishes the most qualified candidates for a
particular job, but it just so happens that the results of the exam would promote
all candidates of one protected status and no candidates of another. While the
object of disparate impact law is to “smoke out” employment practices caused
by non-business related discrimination (fire), in this scenario there is smoke but
there is no fire because the test produces dubious results but is not
discriminatory. Under the majority’s standard, the municipality would not be
121. Id. at 2699.
122. Ricci III, at 2676.
123. Ricci III, dissent, at 2699.
124. Id.
125. That is to say that employers could, in bad faith, argue good faith compliance to escape
liability.
126. Ricci III, at 2675.
127. See Ricci III, dissent, at 2699-2702.
128. This argument is based on the assumptions that throwing the test results out was in fact an
adverse employment action and that the racially disparate results were the decisive factor for the
CSB’s decision.
129. An allusion to the epistemological musings of the Carvakan school of Indian philosophy.
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able to throw out the results. However, under the dissent’s more permissive
standard, the municipality may very well be able to “voluntarily comply” and
dismiss the results as long as they can prove that they had good cause to believe
the exam “would not withstand examination for business necessity.”130 The
municipality would not need to show that the test did not actually conform to
the requirement of business necessity, just that there was good cause to be
concerned about the reliability of the test. The dissent’s standard is equally as
vague as the Strong Basis Test, but it causes more concern because of a potential
for abuse by employers discriminating under the guise voluntary compliance.
B. Is this the Correct Application of the Standard?
After establishing a new standard, the majority issued summary judgment
in favor of the petitioners, ruling that no genuine issue of material fact existed to
dispute the claim that the CSB considered only the racially disparate results in
making its decision.131 The dissent points out that the ruling overlooks the
problems inherent in the test and the availability of less discriminatory
alternative methods of testing.132 No business justification was given for the
60/40 ratio for weighting the written and oral portions133 and alternative
methods with less discriminatory impact were discussed in the CSB hearings. In
reaching its decision, the majority overlooks the minor flaws involved in
creating the test, creating an emphasis that an employment practice need only be
“consistent with business necessity” and not perfectly business related.134 The
majority also emphasizes that racial considerations can be taken into account
when creating a test in an effort to minimize disparate racial impact, but once
the test has been given, allowing a municipality to reject the results based almost
exclusively on the racial make-up of the results is akin to a quota system, and is
illegal under Title VII.135
Two factors in Ricci may have swayed the majority in regards to the
availability of less discriminatory alternative methods of testing available to
New Haven. First, New Haven was constrained by their agreement with the
union on requiring a 60/40 weight given to the written and oral portions of the
exam.136 The dissent questions the business necessity of this requirement,137 but
a possible explanation for this rationale is that the majority’s conclusion
implicitly gives deference to such bargained-for agreements. Alternatively, the
majority’s conclusion in this regard may in fact mean that other less
discriminatory methods were not available, since the other methods discussed
would have weighted the scores differently and were therefore precluded by the
union agreement.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Ricci III, dissent, at 2699.
Ricci III.
See Ricci III, dissent, at 2702-07.
Id. at 2699, n.5.
See Title VII, 703(k).
See Ricci III, at 2676-77.
Id. at 2665.
Ricci III, dissent, at 2699, n.5.
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Additionally, less discriminatory methods that were available only
garnered passing reference in a few of the hearings.138 When alternative
methods were mentioned, they were only mentioned generically, no specific
methods were discussed in detail nor were specific alternative methods of
testing proposed.139 Since so much of the debate and deliberations during the
CSB hearings focused on the racially disparate results and the business necessity
of the test, the majority may have considered this proof that the decision was
based on the racially disparate results, and not that the CSB had alternative
methods in mind when voting not to certify. Future courts may distinguish Ricci
from other cases where more discussion and consideration is given to business
necessity and alternative methods of testing or where bargained-for agreements
on testing methods are not present.
VI. BALANCING ACT – DOES THE SUPREME COURT FIND A MIDDLE-GROUND?
The scope of a precedential ruling must be broad enough to allow future
applications in similar, but not necessarily exact, conditions, but must also avoid
being so broad that it applies to situations it was not intended for. In
employment discrimination, a new rule must further Title VII without violating
the Equal Protection Clause. A rule should also carefully balance the overall
interests of employees, employers, and the government.
The Strong Basis Test tries to balance the competing interests of employers,
employees, and the government in a way that is consistent with Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause. Although it is unclear how the rule will be applied,
future government entities are on notice that more than fear of litigation is
required. It is also unclear how this new standard will affect voluntary
compliance from employers.
This approach serves the interests of employees by requiring a heightened
standard of proof for the employer. In order to avoid liability, the employer
must go beyond the numbers, and investigate the test itself and the testing
process.140 Requiring this inquiry prevents an employer from using an
“unsubstantiated fear” of a disparate impact suit as pretext for discrimination.141
Likewise, employees also benefit from a bona fide defense for employers
because the defense is grounded in scrutinizing a test’s job-relatedness.
Improving the correlation between testing criteria and actual job performance
increases an employer’s ability to choose the best individual for the job, thus
benefiting employer and employee alike. The Strong Basis Test also serves the
interests of the government by retaining the integrity of Title VII by providing
an avenue between the ‘rock and a hard place’ that future employers may find
themselves in, while still mandating equal opportunities for employees.
Courts have established that “voluntary compliance is a preferred means of
achieving Title VII’s goal of eliminating employment discrimination.”142

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See Ricci III, at 2667-71.
See id.
Ricci III, at 2675.
See Pet. Brief on the Merits at 28-32 (Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328).
Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correc. Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1128 (2nd Cir. 1983).
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Congress offers incentives to employers to implement internal regulations and
increase compliance rates, while simultaneously reducing the burden of
regulation imposed on the government. However, it is unclear how the Strong
Basis Test will affect voluntary compliance. The dissent warns that using the
new standard will reduce voluntary compliance because of the current
uncertainty as to how courts will apply the Strong Basis Test, compounded by
the fact that the majority has offered little guidance on applying this test in Title
VII cases.143 The Strong Basis Test may impose so high a burden on
governmental entities that it may actually be in their best interests not to
voluntarily comply, at the risk of costly litigation or a fear of future liability.
Voluntary compliance is the touchstone of Title VII because it is the most
effective way to reduce employment discrimination, it reduces policing and
enforcement costs on the government, and it reduces litigation costs by giving
incentives to proactive employers.144 Due to current uncertainty, the courts are
now faced with the challenge of developing a uniform and consistent approach
to the Strong Basis Test that is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s ruling and
does not disincentivize employers from voluntarily complying with Title VII. In
doing so, the government’s interest will be furthered by promoting equal
employment opportunities and abolishing arbitrary barriers to employment.145
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ricci case presents difficulties for future courts, left in the dark as to
how to apply the Strong Basis Test. Ricci also leaves considerable uncertainty for
future municipalities trying to voluntarily comply with the requirements of Title
VII. The Supreme Court made it clear that “fear of litigation alone” does not
justify disparate treatment, but where future district courts will draw the line is
unclear.146 In addition to a lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, there
remains continued uncertainty if disparate treatment is ever constitutional.147 By
requiring more than just a prima facie threat of disparate impact liability, the
new standard does guard against creating a ‘blanket defense’ against liability
that would allow employers to discriminate under the guise of diversity, thus
nullifying the protections afforded by Title VII. The new standard tries to create
a middle-ground that protects the interests of all parties and furthers voluntary
compliance under Title VII. This will only be accomplished if lower courts apply
the Strong Basis Test uniformly, which is unlikely given the lack of guidance for
doing so from the Supreme Court. Future municipalities are left to wonder
when enough evidence exists that will justify disregarding promotional exam
results, if ever.
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Ricci III, dissent at 2701-02.
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See Ricci III, Scalia, J. concurring at 2682.

